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THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF HYDROPOWER
PROJECT RELICENSING
SARAH C. RICHARDSON*
The salmon has no fixed address. [It] teaches us we must see the entire
landscape. -Bruce Babbitt l
I. INTRODUCTION
By their nature, and because they are Nature, environmental issues
engage "the entire landscape," in complete disregard of human-created
political boundaries. Law, by its nature, draws those boundaries.
Environmental law, developed in response to exigent environmental
issues, attempts to reconcile these apparently contradictory visions. From
its beginnings, environmental law in the United States has grappled with
questions (usually lumped under the heading of "federalism") that involve
the dynamic interrelationships of the states and the federal government2
a historical fault line running through our political landscape.
Jurisdictional issues raised by cases and statutes reflecting
fundamental changes in our society's understanding of the values and
functions of hydropower dams provide a clear example of the complexities
inherent in protecting or restoring an environment that is regulated by both
the national and state governments. As Oregon's Governor John
Kitzhaber said recently in discussing the governance of river basins, "It's a
question of who's in charge." 3
Ms. Richardson received her B.A. in Philosophy from the College of William & Mary
in 1976, her Master's degree in Landscape Architecture from the University of Virginia
in 1989, and expects to receive her J.D. from the College of William & Mary School of
Law in 2001.
1 Glen Martin, Dams Making Way For Salmon; Spawning Invited on Sacramento River
Tributary, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 1999, at A3.
2 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 323-28 (2d ed. 1998).
3 Al Gibbs, Locke Will Fight Plan For Salmon Agency, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, WA),
Jan. 13, 2000, at Dl. Kitzhaber was speaking particularly of the Columbia River, which
he called "our answer to the Balkans" because it is under the jurisdiction of two nations
(the U.S. and Canada), four states, thirteen Indian tribes, and seven federal agencies.
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Early on in the development of the electric industry, the federal
government took a leading role in the regulation of hydropower.
The foundations for strong Federal involvement in the
electricity industry were established between 1901 and
1932, based on three factors: first, the electric power
industry became recognized as a natural monopoly in
interstate commerce (producing a product most efficiently
provided by one supplier) subject to Federal regulation;
second, the Federal Government owned most of the
Nation's hydroelectric resources; and third, Federal
economic development programs accelerated, including
electricity generation.4
In 1920, when Congress created the Federal Power Commission, 5
predecessor to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("Commission" or "FERC"), the federal government's constitutionally
granted powers were thought to leave little question about who was in
charge of navigable waters. 6 During the "big dam era" of the 1930s, '40s,
and '50s, the Commission granted licenses to hundreds of hydropower
projects. 7 Those fifty-year licenses, granted before there was a general
awareness of the environmental losses caused by dams, are now coming
up for relicensure in a much-changed political landscape, over which the
question "who's in charge?" hangs like a storm cloud.8
Section II of this Note provides some historical background for
hydropower development and federal regulation of hydropower, and
discusses FERC's changing approach to the licensing and relicensing of
4Energy Info. Admin., Dep't of Energy, The Changing Structure of the Electric Power
Industry: An Update; Appendix A: History of the US. Electric Power Industry, 1882-
1991, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chgstr/appenda.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2000).
5 The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (Pub. L. No. 66-280) established the Federal
Power Commission (FPC).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ......
7 See Andrew H. Sawyer, Hydropower Relicensing in the Post Dam-Building Era, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1996, at 12 ("Large dams were seen as symbols of progress-
Woody Guthrie sang the praises of Grand Coulee Dam....").
8 Charles R. Sensiba, Comment: Who's in Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 603, 625-32 (1999).
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dams as evidenced by its 1994 policy statement on decommissioning at
project relicensing. Section III discusses FERC's crucial licensing
function for hydropower dams, and Section IV traces the changes in
attitude that led to FERC's 1994 Dam Decommissioning Policy. In
Section V, the Note looks at conflicts of state and federal power that have
been heightened by changes in our understanding of the values and
functions of dams, and sharpened by the requirements of both the
amended Federal Power Act9 and the Clean Water Act.10 Finally, the Note
discusses possible effects of agency policy changes and recent case law on
the hydropower field in the context of electricity deregulation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT
A. Feudal Origins
The monumental hydropower dams of the twentieth century are
technological descendants of the humble watermills that were one of
humankind's earliest methods of transferring energy from nature to run
machinery." Gristmills powered by water, common in medieval times,
were often erected by feudal lords and granted to the miller for public
use.' 2 The early stages of the Industrial Revolution were powered to a
great extent by milldams that made it possible to run larger, more efficient
sawmills and textile factories.13
The growth of waterpower occurred hand-in-hand with, and was a
partial cause of, changing conceptions of property rights.14  As the
landscape of the United States became industrialized (primarily along its
rivers), economic development became more highly valued than
traditional, agrarian land uses.' 5
Evidence of the changing legal view of water rights can be found
in a series of "Mill Acts" passed in the late eighteenth century that "were,
more than any other legal measure, crucial in dethroning landed property
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a etseq. (1994).
10 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
IISee FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY LAW 176-77 (1999).
12 See HUMPHREY W. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF WATERS 145 (2d ed.
1853).
13See BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 177.
14 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 34-
42 (1977).
15 Id. at 40-42.
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from the supreme position it had occupied in the eighteenth century world
view, and ultimately, in transforming real estate into just another cash-
valued commodity."' 16 As a commodity, land-and the water that flows
over it-becomes more susceptible to cost-benefit analyses and
governmental constraints on its use than under the traditional conception
of private property as sacrosanct.
B. Industrial Development in the Nineteenth Century
Although the new industrial uses for rivers in the early nineteenth
century were private enterprises, their benefits were seen as redounding to
the good of society, as one Virginia judge stated in 1816: "[T]he property
of another is, as it were, seized on, or subjected to injury, to a certain
extent, it being considered in fact for the public use."'17 Another state
judge spoke of the Massachusetts Mill Act as being
designed to provide for the most useful and beneficial
occupation and enjoyment of natural streams and water-
courses, where the absolute right of each proprietor to use
his own land and water privileges, at his own pleasure,
cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of necessity, in some
degree, yield to the other.1
8
The Mill Act's controversial constraints on the "absolute right" of
landowners are echoed nearly two centuries later by recent controversies
over the functions, benefits, and regulation of hydropower dams, as I will
discuss later in this Note.
The history of federal hydropower-dam regulation begins almost a
century before any such regulation was actually enacted, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided in 1824 that Congress had regulatory power over
navigation grounded in the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.' 9
In the well-known case of Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court stated that
All America understands, and has uniformly understood,
the word "commerce," to comprehend navigation .... The
word used in the constitution, then, comprehends, and has
16 Id. at 47-48.
17 Skipwith v. Young, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 276, 278 (1816).
18 Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68, 70 (1832).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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been always understood to comprehend, navigation within
its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as
expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the
word "commerce.,
20
For most of the nineteenth century, however, Congress took a
laissez-faire attitude to the regulation of waterpower. Not until the very
end of the century was Congress' navigation power given statutory
formulation in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, Section
10 of which requires Congressional approval for the "creation of any
obstruction... to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United
States .... ,,22
C. Regulation of Hydropower Dams in the Progressive Era
The first decades of the twentieth century saw a fierce and
prolonged debate over the appropriate form of federal approval for one
type of obstruction to navigable capacity: hydropower dams. 23 In 1908
and 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt vetoed Congressional attempts to
allow dams on the Rainy and James Rivers because the legislative
authorizations were not time-limited.24 In one veto statement, Roosevelt
said:
The public must retain the control of the great waterways.
It is essential that any permit to obstruct them for reasons
and on conditions that seem good at the moment should be
subject to revision when changed conditions demand ....
Provision should be made for the termination of the grant
or privilege at a definite time, leaving to future generations
the power or authority to renew or extend the concession in
accordance with the conditions which may prevail at the
time.2
5
20 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190, 193 (1824).
21 WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY § 1.02, at 5 (1983).
22 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994)).
23 See Gifford Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power
Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9, 16-18 (1945).24 H.R. REP. No. 99-507, at 11-12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2496, 2498.
25 ld. at 11.
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Roosevelt, a dedicated conservationist, was determined that the
country's waterways should remain in public control, because "actual
experience of what happens with indeterminate public-utility franchises
proves that they are in the vast majority of cases practically perpetual.
Each right should be issued to expire on a specified day without further
legislative, administrative, or judicial action."
Roosevelt's position was part of a battle between the
conservationists he represented and a coalition of private hydropower
developers and states-rights advocates who wanted to curtail federal
control. 27 "Both groups brought tremendous pressure to bear on Congress,
and the struggle for water power legislation lasted for fifteen years. 28 It
is ironic that, almost a century later, private hydropower developers, rather
than supporting states' rights to condition dam licenses, argue vociferously
that the federal authority eventually vested in FERC should not be
eroded, 29 as this Note discusses at greater length in Section V.
Roosevelt's insistence on a fixed expiration date for hydropower
licenses was unwavering, and in the end he prevailed.3 ° When the Federal
Water Power Act ("FWPA," amended in 1935 as the Federal Power Act
("FPA"))31 was passed in 1920, it included a fifty-year limit on license
terms. 32 Half a century was deemed long enough to protect hydropower
owners' investment by allowing them to recoup their construction costs
and achieve profitability, secure in the knowledge that the terms of a
project license can be changed only by mutual consent of the Commission
and the licensee.
33
26 Id. at 11. See also Roosevelt's veto message in 42 CONG. REc. 4698 (1908):
We are now at the beginning of great development in water power. Its
use through electrical transmission is entering more and more largely
into every element of the daily life of the people. Already the evils of
monopoly are becoming manifest; already the experience of the past
shows the necessity of caution in making unrestricted grants of this
27 great power.
See Beth C. Bryant, Comment, FERC's Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the
Federal Power Act, 74 WASH. L. REv. 95, 101 (1999).
28 Id. at 101.
29 See Press Release, Nat'l Hydropower Ass'n, NHA Renews Call for Legislation In
Wake of Hydro Ruling (Aug. 18, 1999), at http://www.hydro.org/nr002_8-18-99.htm.
30 See 42 CoNG. REc. 4698 (1908).
31 Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). The Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No.
74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), amended the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 and changed
the title to the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 791- 825 (1994)).
32 See Pinchot, supra note 23, at 19.
33 See 16 U.S.C. § 799; see also Sensiba, supra note 8, at 617.
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When the FWPA was enacted in 1920, hydroelectric power
comprised a significant portion of the nation's electrical generating
capacity (about 30 percent-a much greater percentage than the 10 to 12
percent it represented at the end of the twentieth century). 34 To encourage
and coordinate hydropower development, the FWPA created the Federal
Power Commission, precursor of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, with the exclusive 5power to license hydropower projects on
the nation's "navigable waters." 3?
This entrustment of power to a federal agency (an unusual
precursor of the other President Roosevelt's New Deal, when such
delegations became common) was intended' to remedy jurisdictional
conflicts created by the General Dam Acts of 1906 and 1910, which had
required hydropower developers to submit their plans to the Secretary of
War and the Chief of Engineers.36 The Darn Acts were widely seen as a
practical failure, since (as a Congressman noted at the time) "all water-
power development under Federal control [had] practically ceased. 3 7 To
remedy that failure, the Federal Water Power Act created an independent
commission, made up of five members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 3
8
D. Consolidation of Federal Authority Over Hydropower Projects
The FWPA, and later the FPA, provides a grant of broad authority
to the Commission, enabling it to "prescribe, issue, make, amend, and
rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Act,39 in awarding licenses
to projects that are "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or
developing a waterway .... ,40 The Constitutional power over navigation
is incorporated expressly and comprehensively, with navigable waters
34See Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, Water Power: Use and Regulation of a Renewable
Resource, at http://www.ferc.fed.us/hydro/docs/waterpwr.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2000) [hereinafter FERC, Water Power]; see also Am. Pub. Power Ass'n, Hydropower
Licensing and Relicensing Regulation, at http://www.appanet.org/general/issues/
00briefD5.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Am. Pub. Power Ass'n].
35 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
36 See Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3508, 34 Stat. 386; Act of June 23, 1910, ch. 360, 36
Stat. 593.
37 56 CONG. REc. 9118 (1918) (statement of Rep. Snell).
38 See FERC, Water Power, supra note 34.
39 16 U.S.C. § 825h (1994).
40 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (1994).
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defined as "those parts of streams or other bodies of water over which
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce... and
which either in their natural or improved condition... are used or suitable
for use for the transportation of persons or property in interstate or foreign
commerce."4 1 Judicial interpretations of Congress' navigation power have
reinforced its breadth to include nonnavigable sections of navigable
waterways,42 normavifable tributaries that affect the navigability of
connected waterways, and even projects on nonnavigable waters that
affect commerce through transportation of hydroelectricity in interstate
commerce.
44
In its noteworthy 1940 decision of United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co.,45 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress had
delegated broad authority to FERC over rivers that were either navigable
themselves or whose use would affect national commerce. 46  In the
Court's opinion, "It cannot properly be said that the constitutional power
of the United States over its waters is limited to control for navigation ....
In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce..
.. That authority is as broad as the needs of commerce. '47 This expansive
authority brought an even wider range of hydropower projects under
federal authority, increasing FERC's role as a licenser, and leading to
licenses for hundreds of dams in the ensuing decades.48
Another significant hydropower-project case heard by the Supreme
Court in the 1940s, First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal
Power Commission,49 involved the state of Iowa's attempt to impose
conditions on a FERC-approved project that was to divert most of the
waters of the Cedar River in order to run an enormous electricity
generator.5 0 Iowa's laws required that diverted water be returned "to the
nearest practicable place without being materially diminished in quantity
or polluted or rendered deleterious to fish life."'  The Court reinforced
41 16 U.S.C. § 796(8) (1994).
42 See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899).
43 See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
44 See FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1965).
45311 U.S. 377 (1940).
46 Id. at 428.
47 Id. at 426.
48 See Sawyer, supra note 7.
49328 U.S. 152 (1946).
50 Id. at 157-59.
51 IOWA CODE § 7771 (1939).
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FERC's authority over hydropower licensing by finding that the
Commission's congressionally delegated power preempted any state-
imposed conditions.
5 2
To require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to it of a
State permit . . . as a condition precedent to securing a
federal license for the same project under the Federal
Power Act would vest in ... Iowa a veto power over the
federal project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the
effectiveness of the Federal Act. It would subordinate to
the control of the State the "comprehensive" planning
which the Act provides shall depend upon the judgment of
the Federal Power Commission or other representatives of
the Federal Government.
53
Section 27 of the Federal Power Act provides that the Act is not
intended to affect "laws of the respective States relating to the control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for
municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein. 54 The First
Iowa Court interpreted this "saving clause" as limited primarily to the
"proprietary rights" of the state in its waters, for the use of its citizens,
55
which did not include streamflow for fishes. As a consequence, FERC's
authority over hydropower projects was unquestioned for almost fifty
years, until conflicts between the states and FERC that involved
hydropower license conditions took a new direction in the last decade of
the century, as discussed in Section V.
E. The Growth of Environmental Awareness After the Mid-Century
The latter half of the twentieth century has seen a profound change
in our society's perception of the environmental costs of dams. "[T]he
balance of power struck during the Progressive era in favor of centralized
federal authority over the uses of the Nation's navigable waters" 56 has
begun to wobble because of changes in public policy goals that have
52 328 U.S. at 164.
53 Id. (citations omitted).
54 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
55 328 U.S. at 176.
56 Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens: PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology, 25 ENVTL. L. 255, 255-56 (1995).
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resulted in a markedly altered view of the public interest in hydropower
and in natural resources.5 7 The growth of environmental awareness in the
1960s and '70s brought with it a new perspective on the balance of costs
and benefits represented by dams. 58
The costs can be severe: since dams are created in order to
barricade rivers, they also obstruct the fish swimming in those rivers,
which drastically alters the life cycle of indigenous migratory fish
species.59 By slowing rivers and reducing downstream water levels, dams
increase water temperatures and reduce oxygen levels. 60 The obstructions
cause silt to collect on upstream riverbeds, which also destroys habitat and
kills many kinds of fish.6 1 Fish swimming downstream may be killed
directly by being drawn into and cut up by power turbines.62
Hydropower dams also cause severe changes in water levels by
withholding and then releasing water to generate power for peak periods;
fluctuating water levels interrupt the natural growth and reproduction
cycles of many species. 63 "Thus, although a source of renewable energy,
hydropower consumes another valuable natural resource: free-flowing
rivers and the many ecological, recreational, aesthetic, and economic
benefits that rivers provide."
57 See infra, notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
58 See American Rivers, Ten Reasons Why Dams Damage Rivers, at http://www.am
rivers.org/tenlplate2.asp?cat=2&page=22&id=727&filter=10 (last visited Sept. 30, 2000)
t9ereinafter American Rivers, Ten Reasons].See id.
60 See id.
61 See id. See also Testimony of Andrew Rosenberg, Deputy Ass't Adm'r, Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Service, Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, Oct. 28, 1999, at http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/
rosenbergtst1028.htm ("[I]n some watersheds dams may cause up to 90 percent fish
mortality. Dams ... can have cumulative, deleterious effects on the integrity of aquatic
ecosystems upon which anadromous fish depend, and have contributed to the extinction
of many fish stocks and the decline of many more.").
62 See Ted Williams, Freeing the Kennebec River, AUDUBON, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 38.
63 See American Rivers, Ten Reasons, supra note 598.
64Bryant, supra note 27, at 97. But see Nat'l Hydropower Ass'n, Hydropower: A Clean
Energy Source For Our Future at http://www.hydro.org/cleanenergysource.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2000).
([C]arbon emissions avoided by hydroelectric generation is the
equivalent to 61 million additional passenger cars on the roadway-
nearly 50 percent more than there are today . . . .Other pollutants
avoided by the generation of hydropower in 1998 included 1.7 million
tons of sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and 1 million tons of nitrogen oxides, both
key ingredients in acid rain.)
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During the first sixty years of the Commission's existence, it
turned down only one proposed license on aesthetic or recreational
grounds.65  Well into the 1980s, the agency gave short shrift to
environmental factors in licensing decisions and continued to act as "a
friend of the hydroelectricity industry and a nemesis of
environmentalists. ' 66 In fact, FERC didn't even promulgate regulations
implementing NEPA until 1987, seventeen years later than the statutory
requirement, 7 even though one of the first modem environmental-law
cases, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,68 established clearly the Commission's duty to consider
environmental factors in the licensing process.6 a
As another momentous sign of changes to come, in 1967 the
Supreme Court held in Udall v. Federal Power Commission70 that FERC
had failed to consider fishery-resource impacts of the project under
consideration. In the Court's view, section 10(a) of the FPA requires
FERC to balance power generation against environmental impacts,
because the "public interest" provision of the Act7' encompasses
"preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the preservation
of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational purposes, and the
protection of wildlife., 72  The Court's championing of fish against
hydropower signaled a profound change:
The importance of salmon and steelhead in our outdoor life
as well as in commerce is so great that there certainly
65 See JOHN ECHEVERRIA ET AL., RIVERS AT RISK: THE CONCERNED CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
HYDROPOWER 8 (1989).
66 Bryant, supra note 27, at 96.
67 See Michael C. Blumm, Federalism, Hydroelectric Licensing and the Future of
Minimum Streamflows After California v. FERC, 21 ENVTL. L. 113, 115 n.8 (1991).
68 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). When the Federal
Water Power Act was amended and renamed the Federal Power Act in 1935, Congress
widened its scope by defining "recreational purposes" as within the public interest, thus
requiring the Commission to consider at least some nonpower benefits. In Scenic
Hudson, the Second Circuit construed the term "recreational purposes" to include "the
conservation of natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation
of historic sites." Id. at 614.
69 Id. at 620 ("The totality of a project's immediate and long-range effects, and not
merely the engineering and navigation aspects, are to be considered in a licensing
roceeding.").
387 U.S. 428 (1967).
71 16 U.S.C. § 8036).
72 Udall, 387 U.S. at 450.
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comes a time when their destruction might necessitate a
halt in so-called "improvement" or "development" of
waterways. The destruction of anadromous fish in our
western waters is so notorious that we cannot believe that
Congress through the present Act authorized their ultimate
demise.
73
By 1986, Congress had decided that FERC should be giving more
attention to nonpower interests, so it amended the Federal Power Act by
enacting the Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA), which provided
for stronger environmental protection.74 ECPA added § 10(j) to the FPA,
which requires FERC to include in a new license any terms and conditions
pertaining to fish and wildlife that are recommended by state and federal
fish and wildlife agencies. 75 The ECPA compels FERC to give equal
consideration in relicensing procedures to energy conservation, fish and
wildlife preservation, recreational opportunities, energy conservation, and
protection of environmental quality.
This "equal consideration" mandate requires FERC to
consult with federal, state and local resource agencies,
including fish, wildlife, recreation and land management
agencies, in order to assess more accurately the impact of a
hydropower dam on the surrounding environment. In its
evaluation of environmental impacts, FERC is obligated to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or
Environmental Assessment (EA), investigative reports
which assess the environmental consequences of a
proposed hydropower project and compare the impacts
with those of alternatives to the suggested action.77
73 Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted).
74 Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
1994)).
5 16 U.S.C. 8030).
76 See Bryant, supra note 27, at 96 n.12. See also 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
77 See AMERICAN RIVERS, RIVER RENEWAL: RESTORING RIVERS THROUGH
HYDROPOWER DAM RELICENSING 3 (1996) [hereinafter RIVER RENEWAL].
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III. FERC's RELICENSING FUNCTION
Today, between 68,000 and 75,000 dams of various sizes harness
the kinetic energy of flowing water in the United States.7 8 Approximately
2,358 of those are federally licensed hydroelectric power dams that,
combined, produce 74,800 megawatts of generating capacity.79 Because
hundreds of dams were licensed in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, FERC has
had to deal with hundreds of relicensing applications in the past decade.
80
In 1993 alone, 160 licenses expired, representing 262 dams on 105
rivers. 81  In addition, licenses for 550 more dams will come up for
relicensing over the next fifteen years, 82 with sixty-nine expiring in the
83years 2000 and 2001 . Hydropower projects that represent 50 percent of
the nation's installed hydroelectric capacity will be due for license
renewals by the year 2010.84
The relicensing process, which starts three to five years before the
license expires, involves public notice and an environmental review.
85
The Federal Power Act provides five different possibilities for FERC
action at the expiration of a hydropower license: the federal government
can take over and maintain the project86 (which has never occurred); 87
FERC can issue a new license to the incumbent licensee; 88 FERC can
issue a new license to a new licensee89 (this has never happened where the
incumbent licensee made the application); 90 FERC can issue a temporary
nonpower license which transfers the project lands to appropriate Federal,
78 See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 65, at 1 ("The Environmental Protection Agency
estimates at least 68,000, the National Park Service puts the total at 75,00 .....
79 See FERC, Water Power, supra note 34.
80 See American Rivers, RIVER RENEWAL, supra note 77, at 3.
81Id.
82 Id. See also FERC, Water Power, supra note 34 ("The greatest amount of authorized
generating capacity up for relicensing will occur in 2007-approximately 7,420
megawatts.").
83 See FERC, Water Power, supra note 34.
84See Am. Pub. Power Ass'n, supra note 34.
85 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 808(a) - (c) (1994).
86 Id. § 807.
87 Sensiba, supra note 8, at 617.
88 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1).
89 Id.
90 Sensiba, supra note 8, at 617.
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State, or municipal governments9' (this has never occurred); 92 or the
Commission can accept surrender of the license,93 which is quite rare. 94
The Act does not, however, provide any statutory guidance on
decommissioning a hydropower project. When it was passed, and for
decades thereafter, hydropower was unquestioningly accepted as so
desirable that it was inconceivable to imagine a dam becoming less
valuable than the river it impounded.95 Legislative history shows that the
debates over the Act did not involve any consideration of dam removal; in
fact, when one senator raised the possibility of the federal government
ordering removal of a dam, he rushed to add "But, of course, it is
unthinkable that the Government would do anything of that kind, and
[consequently] we must dismiss that."96
IV. DAM DECOMMISSIONING
A. FERC's 1994 Policy on Dam Decommissioning
A combination of factors, including greater understanding of the
environmental costs of dams, increased value given to nonpower river
uses, and the swelling flood of relicensing applications, led FERC to
formulate a new dam-decommissioning policy in 1994.9 The new policy
relied heavily on Section 10(a) of the FPA (the same section the Supreme
Court had focused on in Udall v. Federal Power Commission), which
provides:
That the project adopted . . . shall be such as in the
judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a
comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate
or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization
of water-power development, for the adequate protection,
mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife (including
91 16 U.S.C. § 808(0.
92 Sensiba, supra note 8, at 617.
93 16 U.S.C. § 799.
94Id. § 808. See also Sensiba, supra note 8, at 617.
95See Bryant, supra note 27, at 106.
96 59 CONG. REc. 1474 (1920) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
97See FERC, Project Decommissioning at Relicensing: Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg.
339 (1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 2.24 (1997)) [hereinafter FERC Policy Statement].
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related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other
beneficial public uses, including irrigation, flood control,
water supply, and recreational and other purposes .... 98
In its policy statement, FERC concluded that, in order to
"satisfactorily protect the public interests involved," 99 the Commission has
"the legal authority to deny a new license at the time of relicensing if it
determines that, even with ample use of its conditioning authority, no
license can be fashioned that will comport with the statutory standard
under section 10(a).. . ."'00o Outright denial will be rare, according to the
Policy Statement, as licensing conditions will provide the required balance
between power and environmental safeguards.' 0 ' Decommissioning is
more likely to occur when "the licensee of an already marginal project is
confronted with additional costs at relicensing that render the project
,,102
uneconomic. Those costs will arise when FERC imposes
environmental or other conditions, and decommissioning will be the de
facto result even if not expressly commanded by FERC.'03
In response to industry commenters' objections that, if license
conditions make the project uneconomic, then the conditions must be
rejected as unreasonable, FERC quotes a Seventh Circuit opinion:
"[T]here can be no guarantee of profitability of water power projects
under the Federal Power Act; . . . values other than profitability require
appropriate consideration."'
10 4
The Policy Statement notes that frequently conditions placed on a
project's license come, not from FERC, but from the state in which the
dam is located. 10 5 The Clean Water Act10 6 (CWA) empowers states to
approve or deny water-quality certification for hydropower projects, and
the Supreme Court has ruled that FERC must include the state's CWA
conditions in a license. 10 7  Moreover, when the Energy Consumer
98 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1).
99 FERC Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 344.




104 Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994).
105 FERC Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 342.
106 Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
107 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
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Protection Act was passed, Congress mandated that FERC licenses "shall
be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of [federal land
management agencies] shall deem necessary for the adequate protection
and utilization of such [federal land] reservation ..... 108
B. Funding Dam Decommissioning
The crucial question of how decommissioning will be funded is of
particular concern to the states (or, if the dam is on federal land, other
federal agencies) who may find themselves with a defunct and "deadbeat"
(non-power-producing) dam left on their hands by an owner who could
not afford the decommissioning costs.109 The 1994 Policy Statement
briefly considers requiring hydropower projects to institute
decommissioning funds, but rejects that idea because it "could mean
unnecessarily tying up substantial amounts of the capital of financially
sound licensees in less than optimum investments for extensive
periods."I 0 FERC leaves open the possibility that a licensee might act on
its own to set up a fund if the risk of decommissioning looms ahead, and
could recover the costs of the decommissioning fund in its rates."'
The Commission also discarded a second funding option,
establishing an industry-wide decommissioning fund financed by annual
charges, because it found inadequate evidence of the need for such an
administratively challenging fund. 1 2 Although the Commission rejected
the adoption of such long-term funding requirements, it made clear its
policy that "[t]he licensee has the responsibility for project retirement,"
not the federal government." 3 FERC's rationale for this position is that
"the licensee created the project and benefited from its operations."'"14
C. The Decommissioning Policy in Action
The first test of FERC's new policy was presented three years after
the Policy Statement by the relicensing process for the Edwards Dam,
108 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (West Supp. 2000). See Section V infra for further discussion of
these issues.
109See FERC Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 346.
110 Id.
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built on the Kennebec River in Maine's capital, Augusta. 15 The dam, one
of the hundreds built to provide mechanical power for sawmills in the
early nineteenth century, had been a mainstay of industrial development in
the area, and later was converted to generate electricity. 116 By the time its
license came up for renewal, however, the dam was generating only one-
tenth of one percent of Maine's electricity, and many advocacy groups
were calling for restoration of the historic-and remunerative-shad,
sturgeon, sea bass, and salmon fisheries on the river, devastated by the
dam for more than 160 years." 7
In 1997, FERC denied the renewal of the Edwards Dam license."18
"The potential for fisheries restoration was so great, the electricity
generated so minimal, that the consensus for removal was almost
inevitable."' 1 9 Although the dam operator at first threatened to fight the
denial, the parties reached a settlement in which the dam was turned over
to the state. 12  Upstream hydropower dams and a downstream
shipbuilding company jointly funded the removal and fish-restoration
programs. 21 In this agreement, the consortium of hydropower dams was
given a longer time before it had to install required fish ladders, and the
shipbuilder was allowed to fill in seventeen acres of the river to build new
dry docks. 12
2
D. Negotiated Decommissioning Settlements: The Future
The "many-back scratcher"' 23  settlement reached in Maine
provides a glimpse of the likely future for dam-relicensing controversies.
Similarly, in September 1999, a voluntary agreement to remove the Condit
Dam, located in southwestern Washington state, was signed by the
115 See Press Release, American Rivers, Edwards Dam Removal Marks Turning Point for




118 See Bruce Babbitt, Dams are Instruments, Not Monuments, Remarks for FERC
Distinguished Speaker Series (July 8, 1998), at http://www.doi.gov/secretary/ferc
note.htm.
Id.
120 See John McPhee, Farewell to the Nineteenth Century: The Breaching of Edwards
Dam, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 1999, at 44, 48.
121 See Babbitt, supra note 118.
122 See McPhee, supra note 120, at 48.
123 Id.
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Yakima Indian Nation, PacifiCorp, environmental groups, state and
federal fishery agencies, and the Columbia Inter-Tribal Fish Commission,
after two years of negotiations. 24 The agreement provided that the dam, a
14-megawatt project on the White Salmon River, will be removed to open
up a salmon run from the Columbia River, but that before removal it could
continue operating for seven years in order to generate funds that will
offset the decommissioning costs.'
25
Because of the agreement, PacifiCorp will be able to avoid
carrying out relicensing conditions (primarily fish passages) that had been
spelled out in FERC's Environmental Impact Statement for the project.
Fulfilling those conditions could have cost $30 million or more, whereas
removing the dam and contributing to fishery restoration will cost an
estimated $17.15 million.' 26 Just as FERC foresaw in its 1994 Policy
Statement, 127  decommissioning for this project resulted from
environmental conditions that rendered the hydropower project
uneconomic.
Such environmental/economic trade-offs may become a regular
part of the hydropower field, as hydropower projects coming up for
relicensing find themselves in a new regulatory landscape where they face
FERC- or state-imposed environmental conditions, and they know that
FERC will not necessarily shy away from decommissioning. If, as in the
Edwards and Condit Dam situations, restoration programs would cost far
more than removal of dams that do not produce highly profitable amounts
of power, hydropower operators are likely to turn to their surrounding
municipalities and states in search of innovative solutions.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE LICENSE CONDITIONS: CONFLICT OR
COORDINATION?
The issue of state-imposed conditions on dam licensing and
relicensing, which had seemed moribund after the First Iowa decision
discussed in Section II (D), was revived almost half a century later by
PUD No. ] of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology128





127 See FERC Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 340.
128 511 U.S. 700, (1994); see infra Section V(B).
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(PUD No. 1). Only four years before PUD No. 1, the Supreme Court had
reaffirmed its First Iowa holding of FERC's exclusive authority in
California v. FERC (Rock Creek). 2 9 The Rock Creek Court held that
California's imposition of stream-flow conditions on an existing dam was
preempted by FERC's license, since stream flow is not a proprietary right
like irrigation or municipal uses, as covered by § 27 of the FPA.130
Another section of the FPA, however, had been used a decade
before PUD No. 1 to uphold license conditions imposed by federal
agencies, in Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission
Indians.'1 Those conditions, imposed by the Secretary of the Interior,
allowed certain Indian Tribes the right to use water that hydropower
licensees, supported by FERC, believed was properly theirs. 3 2 The D.C.
Circuit Court found that "while Congress intended that the Commission
would have exclusive authority to issue all licenses, it wanted the
individual [federal agency] Secretaries to continue to play the major role
in determining what conditions would be included in the license in order
to protect the resources under their respective jurisdictions.' 33  As a
result, the court said, FERC's licensing procedure is subject to those
conditions that an agency Secretary deems necessary.' 34
That case created the first crack in the monumental dam of First
Iowa. Another crack appeared when the Ninth Circuit held in
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation v. FERC135 that
relicensing a hydropower project is "substantially equivalent" to issuing
an original license, and so the Commission was required to make the same
inquiries into environmental impacts as the amended Federal Power Act
had instituted for new licenses.' 36 FERC argued that no Environmental
Impact Statement was needed since the relicensing involved no changes,
but was only the continuation of the status quo.'37 The court, however,
held that "[rielicensing ... is more akin to an irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of a public resource than a mere continuation of the status
129 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
130 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
131 466 U.S. 765 (1984); see also Ransel, supra note 56, at 259.
132 See Escondido, 466 U.S. at 780-84.
133 Id. at 775.
134 See id. at 777.
135746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984).
136 See id. at 476.
137 See id. at 475.
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quo .... [and] involves a new commitment of the resource."' 38 As a
result, the Commission was required to consider environmental impacts
before relicensing an existing hydropower project.'1 39
These cracks in FERC's ultimate licensing authority became a
visible leak in 1987 when another D.C. Circuit Court case, Monongahela
Power Co. v. Marsh,140 brought the Clean Water Act into juxtaposition,
and consequently into conflict, with the Federal Power Act. CWA
§301(a) forbids "the discharge of any pollutant by any person,"' 14 1 and
§404(a) of the Act requires a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers
for any discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. 42 In
Monongahela, the court held that the §4 04 permitting requirements was a
condition precedent to FERC's license. 4 3  As counsel for the Army
pointed out, Congress expressly exempted certain enumerated activities
from the permit requirement in §§1344(f) and (r) of the CWA, but did not
exempt FERC-licensed hydroelectric projects from those requirements. 144
By holding that "'the Federal Power Act is not immune from effects of
other subsequent acts of Congress,"" 145 the Monongahela court used the
Clean Water Act to chip away at the exclusive authority over hydropower
licensing extended to FERC in First Iowa.
A. The Clean Water Act
The stated objective of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 146
The Monongahela court called that ambitiously comprehensive goal a
"radical change in legislative policy,' ' 147 and certainly it represents a
138 Id. at 476-77.
139 See id. at 477.
140 809 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
141 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
142 See id. § 1344(a).
143 See Monongahela, 809 F.2d at 52.
144 See id. at 44.
145 Id. at 53 n. 117 (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. United States, 607 F.2d 935, 941
(Ct. Cl. 1979)). The court protested that it did not view its holding as "a 'repeal' of FPC
[now FERC) authority but as a reconciliation seen by Congress as necessary to ensure the
protection of a vital national interest." Id. at 53.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
147 See Monongahela, 809 F.2d at 45.
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"holistic focus on the overall integrity of the Nation's waters '' 148 that
values rivers for many more reasons than their capacity to produce
electricity. The achievement of this comprehensive regulatory design
entails a cooperative scheme "that implicates both federal and state
administrative responsibilities."'149
Section 303 of the CWA requires all states to promulgate water-
quality standards. 150  These standards are categorized in three ways:
designations of uses of a waterway (referred to generally as "designated
uses"), specific criteria designed to protect those uses ("specific
criteria"), 51 and a prohibition against degradation of the existing uses of
the water ("antidegradation"). 152 EPA has promulgated regulations
pursuant to the CWA that require States to "develop and adopt a statewide
antidegradation policy and identify the methods for implementing such
policy.' '153  The antidegradation policy "requires the maintenance of
existing uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect them."'154
Section 401 of the CWA obliges "[a]ny applicant for a Federal
license or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters" to obtain a water quality certification
from the state, known as a "401 certificate."' 55 Unless the certificate
states that the discharge will comply with the provisions of the CWA, no
license or permit may be issued for that project.' 56 As part of the license
application's certification, the state must include water-quality conditions
for the project that will ensure its compliance with that state's water-
quality standards. 5 7 The result is that "the states' conditions become part
of the federal license or permit by operation of law."' 58 This statutory
provision has resulted in a line of federal cases that explore the boundaries
148 See Michael M. Wenig, How "Total" Are "Total Maximum Daily Loads "?-Legal
Issues Regarding the Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean
Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 95 (1998).
149PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704
t1994).
50 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
151See id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
152See id. § 1313(d)(4)(B).
15340 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1999).
154 Ransel, supra note 56, at 262.
15533 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
156 Id.
Id.
158 See Ransel, supra note 56, at 261.
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of FERC's authority under the Federal Power Act and the states' authority
to impose conditions on federal licenses under the Clean Water Act.
B. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology
The power of a state to impose conditions on FERC licenses for
hydropower projects in that state was the fundamental issue in PUD No.
1. 59 The case arose from a proposal by the City of Tacoma and a public
utility district in eastern Washington State to divert water from slightly
over a mile of the Dosewallips River in order to run two turbines at a
hydropower dam.160  As part of their federal license application, the
project developers applied to the Washington State Department of
Ecology ("Ecology") for certification under CWA § 401.161
The Dosewallips, categorized as an "extraordinary" water body
(Class AA-the highest rating), is home to Coho and Chinook salmon and
Steelhead trout. 162  To protect these salmonid species, the state had
established a strong antidegradation requirement for the river, and Ecology
conditioned its § 401 certificate for the license on a constraint that the
project must maintain instream water flows two to three times greater than
the project developers proposed to maintain. 163 This condition brought
into dispute the relationship between water quality and water quantity in
state conditioning authority, and the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor, in her majority opinion, stated that the central issue in
the case was "whether the minimum stream flow requirement that the
State imposed on the ... [p]roject is a permissible condition of a § 401
certification. ' 164
In their appeal of Ecology's imposition of minimum stream flow
rates, the city and local utility district argued that, because the Clean
Water Act is exclusively concerned with water quality, it does not allow
states to regulate water quantity.' 65 The Court, however, called that claim
"an artificial distinction," because "a sufficient lowering of the water
quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated uses, be it
159 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
160 See id. at 708-09.
161 See id. at 709.
162 See T. Mike Blake, Jr., Note, Water: PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology: State Water Quality Certification of Federally Licensed
Hydropower Projects, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 817, 821 (1995).
63 See PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 709.
164 Id. at 710.
165 See id. at 719.
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for drinking water, recreation, navigation or, as here, as a fishery."'166 In
addition, Justice O'Connor pointed to the Act's "broad conception of
pollution.., which expressly evinces Congress' concern with the physical
and biological integrity of water" as refutation of a statutory distinction
between quality and quantity. 16 7 As a result, the Court found that the
resource agency's imposition of stream flow conditions on the license was
a permissible exercise of the state's authority under.the CWA, "insofar as
necessary to enforce a designated use contained in a state water quality
standard.'
168
The Court's "expansive reading"'169 of CWA § 401 in PUD No. 1
appears to give states broad authority to impose § 401 conditions on
federal licenses, and Justice Stevens' brief concurrence emphasizes this
point: "Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the Clean Water Act
purports to place any constraint on a State's power to regulate the quality
of its own waters more stringently than federal law might require.'
70
C. Other Recent Cases That Have Shaped the Licensing Landscape
1. North Carolina v. FERC
A proposed inter-basin transfer of water between North Carolina
and the City of Virginia Beach in Virginia 171 led to a multi-stranded tangle
of cases that included North Carolina v. FERC.172 The water in question
is drawn from a Virginia stream that feeds Lake Gaston, an impoundment
created by a FERC-licensed hydroelectric dam. 173  In 1995, FERC
amended the existing license to allow the withdrawal of water for Virginia
Beach. 174 North Carolina asserted that any withdrawal of water from the
lake, which straddles the border of the two states, constituted a federally




169 Id. at 728 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
171 See Paul Schmidt, Note, Un-Neighborly Conduct: Why Can't Virginia Beach and
North Carolina Be Friends? 23 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 893, 895-904
S1999).
72 See North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
173 See Schmidt, supra note 171, at 895.
174 See 112 F.3d at 1182.
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Water Act.'7 5 Therefore, they argued, the Commission should have
obtained a § 401 certificate from North Carolina before amending the
license to allow any withdrawal of water. 1
76
A majority of the D.C. Circuit Court, however, found that the §
401 certificate was not required by the Clean Water Act.1 77 The court's
holding was based on its analysis of the meaning of "discharge," for which
the court looked to the definitional section of the U.S. Code chapter that
includes the Clean Water Act as "the nearest evidence we have of
definitional intent by Congress .... ,,178 That section speaks of discharge
in two ways: when used in the term "discharge of pollutants,"'179 and when
used alone without qualification. 180  "Discharge," when used alone,
"provides a statement of inclusion"' 8'1 rather than a specified definition,
and the specific example given by the statute of what "discharge" may
include is "discharge of pollutants.""' 2  When modified in this way,
"discharge of pollutants" is defined to mean "any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source."'
' 83
The court's conclusion from this comparison of definitions was
that "discharge" must mean essentially the same thing that "discharge of
pollutants" means, 84 rather than encompassing a broader category of
pollution that might include low stream flows. Since the withdrawal of
water for Virginia Beach constituted only an alteration of the downstream
water flow rather than an addition of pollutants to it, the court found that
"neither the withdrawal of water from the Lake nor the reduction in the
volume of water passing through the dam turbines 'results in a discharge'
for purposes of Section 401 (a)(l)."185
175See id. at 1180.
176 See id. "[T]hirty-nine States signed an amicus brief strongly opposing FERC's
assertion that North Carolina has no certification rights over this license amendment." Id.
at 1195 (Wald, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 1194.
'
78 Id. at 1187.
179See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994) (defining term "discharge of a pollutant").
180 See id. § 1362(16) (defining term "discharge").
181 112F.3dat 1187.
182 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16).
183 Id. § 1362(12).
184 112 F.3d at 1187. "How the majority manages to limit the scope of the unqualified
term 'discharge' to one subset that is 'include[d]' in the broader term is beyond my ken."
Id. at 1197 (Wald, J., dissenting).
185Id. at 1187.
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As a consequence of the court's ruling, FERC was not required to
obtain § 401 certification from North Carolina,186 and Virginia Beach was
freed to connect a pipeline that can provide up to 60 million gallons of
water daily to a region that regularly experiences water shortages.' 8 7 The
threat of a future § 401 certification still looms, however, since the
hydropower project at Lake Gaston comes up for relicensing in 2001, and
North Carolina has threatened to withhold its certification while the
pipeline is in operation.
188
2. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas
Another case that turned on the meaning of "discharge" was
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas,189 where the licenses being
challenged were grazing permits rather than dam licenses. The plaintiffs
(eight environmental groups and a tribe) sought a judicial declaration that
the U.S. Forest Service, which issued the permits without requiring the
permittees to undergo the state certification process, was violating the
CWA because the land-denuding effects of grazing polluted the
waterways with runoff.190
The Forest Service asserted that because § 401 applies only to
"discharges," it cannot be interpreted to encompass nonpoint source
pollution from grazing cattle. 191 Thus, the question before the court was,
what constitutes a "discharge"? The trial court construed the word
broadly, finding "that pollution caused by cattle grazing constitutes a
'discharge ... into navigable waters' within the meaning of § 401 of the
CWA.'
192
186 See id. at 1194. In her dissent, Judge Wald accused the majority of engaging in
"dictionary jurisprudence" and of applying a "niggardly construction" that threatened
Congress' policy of putting states "in charge of making and enforcing the crucial
.udgrents surrounding water quality within their borders." Id. at 1197 n. 7, 1197, 1198.
See John Murphy, Quenching the Thirst for Growth; 76-Mile Water Lifeline Becomes
a Reality at Last; New Water Systems and Partnerships Will Help Area Nurture
Development, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Nov. 7, 1997, at B 1.
188 See Karen Weintraub, Court Refusal Ends Gaston Battle; Power Permit Fight Just
Now Starting, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1.
189 940 F.Supp. 1534 (D.Or. 1996), rev'd, remanded sub nom. Oregon Nat'l Desert Ass'n
v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. Or. 1998), cert. denied, 145 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1999).
190 Id. at 1537.
191 See Ransel, supra note 56, at 270 (citing letter from Regional Forester John E. Lowe
responding to the notice of intent to sue).
192 Thomas, 940 F.Supp. at 1541.
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On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed that opinion. 193
"Neither the phrase 'nonpoint source discharge' nor the phrase 'discharge
from a nonpoint source' appears in the Act. Rather, the word 'discharge'
is used consistently to refer to the release of effluent from a point
source."' 194  The court noted particularly that the plaintiffs/appellees'
reliance on PUD No. I was not germane, because "[t]he Supreme Court in
PUD No. 1 did not broaden the meaning of the term 'discharge"' 195 under
the CWA. The construction of the dam under challenge in PUD No. 1
would have resulted in discharges from dredge and fill operations and
from the dam's tailrace; both were categorizable as potential point-source
discharges, unlike the runoff from cattle grazing. 196
An interesting question lingers in the wake of this case that may
have ramifications for hydropower-project relicensing. If the state, rather
than citizens' groups, had sought to include conditions pertaining to
nonpoint pollution in the Forest Service permits, would the court have
reached a different conclusion? Given the Supreme Court's broad ruling
in PUD No. 1 that states can use the § 401 certification to protect the
state's water-quality standards for designated uses of waterways,' 97 it is
conceivable that such a case would have had a different outcome. 198 In a
future dam relicensing case where a state includes water-quality
conditions related to nonpoint source pollution in its § 401 certification, a
court might well look to the 9th Circuit's discussion of "discharge" in
Oregon Nat'l Desert Assoc. v. Thomas, in conjunction with the D.C.
Circuit's discussion of that same word in North Carolina v. FERC.199
3. American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, Second Circuit (American Rivers I)
Another look at the scope of states' ability to impose conditions on
federal licenses came in American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC (American Rivers
193 See Oregon Nat'l Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998).
194 Id. at 1098.
195 Id.
196 See id. at 1098.
197 511 U.S. 700, 701 (1994).
198 Although licenses in Indian country may be subject to conditions imposed by the
tribe, as held in Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466
U.S. 765 (1984), the permits in question in Oregon Nat 7 Desert Ass'n were for grazing
on federally owned land rather than on an Indian reservation.
199See Ransel, supra note 56, at 271 ("After [PUD No. 1 of) Jefferson County, it appears
that the states may act to attain water quality goals reflected in designated uses, even
though a federally licensed project may have eliminated the use.").
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J),200 in which the State of Vermont, in conjunction with the
environmental group, American Rivers, sought to enforce the inclusion of
§ 401 certification conditions in FERC licenses for proposed hydropower
projects in the state, including principally a license to restore a historic
mill site in Tunbridge Village.20 1  Among these conditions were
"reopener" terms that made any changes in the project subject to state
approval of the project's minimum water flow, erosion control, fish
passages, and desilting procedures.2 °2
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in PUD No. 1,203
and notwithstanding also its own longstanding policy,20 4 FERC contended
that, because the state's reopener conditions were unrelated to water
quality, they exceeded the scope of the state's authority under § 401 .205
The Commission argued that its paramount role in hydropower licensing
under the Federal Power Act gave it preemptive authority to decide if state
conditions on hydropower licenses were outside the scope of CWA §
401206
The Second Circuit, in ruling against FERC, held that the statutory
language of the Clean Water Act was "unequivocal, leaving little room for
FERC to argue that it has authority to reject state conditions it finds to be
ultra vires."20 7  The court found controlling precedent in Escondido
Mutual Water Co., 20 8 in which the Supreme Court relied upon "'[t]he
mandatory nature of the language chosen by Congress ' '2°9 in requiring
FERC to accept conditions imposed by an independent government
agency, even if it disagreed with them.210 The court drew a strong parallel
between the role of an independent government agency acting under the
200 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
201 Id. at 102.
202 See id. at 102-03 n.3.
203 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
204 129 F.3d at 103 (citing FERC proceedings where review of appropriateness of § 401
conditions, whether related to water quality or not, was found to be solely within the
purview of state courts: Town of Sumnersville, 60 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep.
(CCH) 61,291, at 61,990 (1992), Carex Hydro, 52 Fed. Energy Reg. Cornni'n Rep.
(CCH) 61,216 at 61,769 (1990), Central Maine Power Co., 52 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,033 at 61,172 (1990)).
205 Id. at 106-07.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 107.
208 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
209 129 F.3d at 109 (quoting Escondido, 466 U.S. at 772).
210 Id. at 109-10 (citing Escondido, 466 U.S. at 772).
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Federal Power Act (as in Escondido) and the states as certifying agencies
under § 401 of the Clean Water Act, 211 and denied that FERC had "a
roving mandate to decide that substantive aspects of state-imposed
conditions are inconsistent with the terms of § 401, ' 212 notwithstanding
the "wide preemptive reach" of the FPA.213
An interesting aspect of this case is that the court squarely faces,
and calmly accepts, a prospect that FERC apparently finds repugnant,
namely that the Commission can "protect[] its field of authority by simply
refusing to issue the license as . . . conditioned., 214 The possibility of
decommissioning hydropower projects as a result of environmental
conditions imposed by states or federal agencies thus becomes even more
of a reality, through judicial recognition and acceptance.
4. American Rivers v. FERC, Ninth Circuit (American Rivers II)
Two years later, FERC again defended its authority to determine
relicensing terms against American Rivers, which joined the Oregon
Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Federal Department of the
Interior in challenging the terms of new licenses issued by FERC to the
Eugene Water and Electric Board in Oregon. 215 The Ninth Circuit Court
found that this argument struck "a familiar chord, ', 216 and looked again to
Escondido217 for precedent in deciding whether FERC has sole authority
to decide if license conditions that required fish passages exceed
statutorily permitted limits.218
Similar to American Rivers I, it was not just another federal agency
imposing conditions (as in Escondido), but also the state in which the
hydropower project was to be built.219 The Ninth Circuit noted that in
American Rivers I, the Second Circuit had extended the Escondido
holding to other statutory provisions, specifically the certification





215 American Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
216Id. at 1206.
217 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
218 201 F.3d at 1207.
2 19 Seeid. at 1190.
220 Id. at 1207.
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governed by the Federal Power Act rather than the Clean Water Act, and
that made a crucial difference in the court's holdings.
After noting that FERC had taken the required "hard look at the
range of licensing alternatives" 221 (including dam removal) to continued
operation of the facility, the court interpreted two "markedly different"
222
223
sections of the FPA to determine the scope of FERC's authority. FPA §
100)224 requires that FERC give what the court called "significant
deference', 2 5 to recommendations made by federal and state fish and
wildlife agencies for the "protection, mitigation, and enhancement" of fish
and wildlife.226 Nevertheless, according to the court, "Congress clearly
has ordained that this deference must yield to the Commission's reasoned
judgment" when FERC judges the conditions to be against public
interest.
227
On the other hand, the court found there was a critical asymmetry
between that part of the act and § 18,228 which does not contain a
"qualifying clause, such as the one in FPA subsection 100)(2), which
expressly enables the Commission to reject a recommendation" from
federal or state resource agencies. 229 Because of the mandatory language
in this section of the Act, FERC is required to accept federal agency
conditions related to fishways.
230
Because the license conditions at issue pertained to fish passages to
be included in the relicensed project, the court had to grapple with the
question of what should be used as a baseline for purposes of judging
FERC's environmental assessment of those fishways.231 The petitioners
objected to FERC's use of existing environmental conditions (i.e., with the
dams in place) as a baseline, and argued for one "embodying a theoretical
reconstruction of what the McKenzie River basin would be like today had
221 Id. at 1201.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 16 U.S.C. § 8030) (1994).
225 201 F.3d at 1205.
226 16 U.S.C. § 8030)(1).
227 201 F.3d at 1205.
228 16 U.S.C. § 811 ("The Commission shall require the construction, maintenance, and
operation by a licensee at its own expense of... such fishways as may be prescribed by
the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate.").
229 201 F.3d at 1206.
230 See id. at 1207 ("[W]e reject the Conmnission's vision of its absolute role in
relicensing.").
231 See id. at 1195.
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the [hydropower] projects not been in place for the greater part of this
century.
'23?
The Ninth Circuit court delved into the legislative history of the
FPA in search of congressional intent regarding an appropriate baseline,
but found the record murky enough to require deference to the agency's
choice. 233 The court deemed the agency's actions reasonable, because
"nothing in the FPA suggests that the only acceptable future for the
McKenzie River basin is a recreation of its past., 234 Since a fundamental
goal of the FPA was to enable development of hydropower projects, it is
not surprising that the Act could be interpreted as embodying a statutory
presumption in favor of those projects as built.
The court's mixed holding-that FERC must accept fishway
conditions from other federal agencies, but need not consider returning
water flows to pre-dam levels-met with mixed reactions. The National
Hydropower Association, an industry advocacy group, expressed
disappointment that resource agencies would be allowed to "exercise
significant operational and other controls over licensed [hydropower]
projects with little public accountability," 235 fearing that the result would
be "a system that will not balance economic and numerous other public
benefits with those of fisheries, as we believe Congress intended., 236 The
group's concerns were allayed slightly by the court's holding that fishway
plans did not require a pre-project baseline.237
The mandatory conditioning authority of federal resource agencies,
as upheld by the Ninth Circuit in American Rivers v. FERC, has had a
notable impact on recent relicensing efforts. In Oregon, a dam owned by
PacifiCorp that came up for relicensing in 1997 was the subject of a newly
developed alternative relicensing process developed by FERC in an
232 Id.
233 See id. at 1197 ("'When relevant statutes are silent on the salient question, we assume
that Congress has implicitly left a void for an agency to fill. We must therefore defer to
the agency's construction of its governing statutes, unless that construction is
unreasonable."' (quoting Ass'n of Pub. Agency Customers v. Bonneville Power Admin.,
126 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 1997))).234 Id. at 1198.
235 Nat'l Hydropower Ass'n, supra note 29.236 Id.
237 See Court Rules FERC Must Follow Agency 'Fishway' Recommendations for Dams,
UTILITY ENVIRONMENT REPORT, Aug. 27, 1999, at 1.
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attempt to streamline the lengthy and confrontational procedure.238 The
negotiations came to a halt when PacifiCorp withdrew in response to U.S.
Forest Service findings that the dam must either be removed or add top-of-
the-line fishways to satisfy the provisions of its Northwest Forest Plan.
239
Another relicensing application in the Pacific Northwest, for Enloe Dam
in Washington, was rejected by FERC in February 2000, after the National
Marine Fisheries Service imposed fish passage requirements on the
project.
240
The broad, preemptive authority granted to FERC during the "big
dam era" by the Federal Power Act has been narrowed and constrained by
the Clean Water Act's requirements that state-imposed conditions must be
incorporated into a federal license, 24 1 and by amendments to the Federal
Power Act that gave federal agencies mandatory conditioning authority.
42
FERC's only apparent recourse, if it finds that those conditions impinge
upon its authority, is to deny the license.
243
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF HYDROPOWER
In recent years, both the hydroelectric industry and conservation
groups have been inclined to see hydropower as an increasingly threatened
form of electricity generation.244 The Energy Information Administration
released a report in December, 1999, that forecast a decline in
hydroelectric power through 2020, "as regulatory actions limit capacity at
existing sites and no large new sites are available for development.,
245
238 See Mark Dantos, Agency's Dam Removal Demand Stirs Debate Over Licensing
Process, INSIDE FERC, Dec. 13, 1999, at 1; see also Tom Tiernan, Sampson Focusing on
Improving Hydro Licensing Without Congress' Help, INSIDE FERC, June 8, 1998, at 1.
239 See Dantos, supra note 238, at 1.
240 Press Release, Nat'l Hydropower Ass'n, Hydro License Hijacked by Fish Agency
(Feb. 25, 2000), at http://www.hydro.org/nr002_2-25-00.htm; see also Press Release,
American Rivers, Enloe Dam License Denied (Feb. 23, 2000), at http://www.amrivers.
or /template2.asp?cat=7&page=1 65&id=440&filter=- 1.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994).
242 16 U.S.C. § 811 (1994).
243 See American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 1997).
244 See Press Release, Nat'l Hydropower Ass'n, Hydro Generation to Decline, Fed
Report Says (Dec. 16, 1999), at http:/www.hydro.org/99releases.htm; see also American
Rivers, Rivers Unplugged: Removing Dams That Don't Make Sense, at http://www.am
rivers.org/template2.asp?cat=2&page=22&id=333& filter=10 (last visited Sept. 30,
2000).
245 Energy Info. Admin., Dep't of Energy, Annual Energy Outlook 2000: Overview, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ aeo/ overview.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
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Not only regulatory changes are to blame for the projected decline
of hydropower dams: "energy deregulation and low electricity prices
caused in part by a glut of natural gas, more efficient natural-gas turbines,
and conservation have turned many dams into economic dinosaurs., 246
The argument that hydropower dams cause environmental damage is
countered by those who point to the benefits of electricity generation
without the greenhouse gases produced by coal or gas-fired facilities.247
The increasing momentum of deregulation in the electricity
industry is almost certain to have a significant impact on hydropower.
"[H]ydropower, which historically has been the low-cost producer of
electricity, finds itself in a competitive battle with alternative sources of
power which are not subject to the same complexities required of
hydropower project licensing or relicensing." 248  Hydropower project
owners, who may have thought their largest costs had long since been paid
off, now face new costs of upgrading or building fishways, installing
turbine screens to deflect fish, or reducing generation in order to maintain
streamflow requirements. 249
Changes in the relicensing process have made hydropower project
licenses appear less like stable, fifty-year-long property rights and more
like mutable strategic investments. For example, a recent relicensing
agreement for hydropower projects on the Clark Fork River in Idaho and
Montana, which was reached using FERC's new collaborative licensing
process, produced a settlement that has been called a "living license., 2 °
Under the agreement between Avista Corporation and Trout Unlimited,
terms and conditions of the new forty-five-year license would stay open,
and could be changed any time during the license period.25'
This "settlement-based regulatory model" gives FERC a "power of
delay and even of decommissioning" that encourages hydropower
managers to collaborate with stakeholders and interested parties,
246 Reed McManus, Down Come the Dams, 83 SIERRA 16 (May 15, 1998) ("In the
Pacific Northwest, privately owned gas-fired turbines sell electricity at about the same
*rce as dams operated by the federally subsidized Bonneville Power Administration.").
See Talk of Greenhouse Gas Avoidance May Signal Relicensing Analysis Shift, INSIDE
FERC, Feb. 21, 2000 at 3 [hereinafter Relicensing Shift].
248 Judith A. Johansen, Is Hydropower an Endangered Species? NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1994, at 13.
249 See Sawyer, supra note 7, at 13.
250 Relicensing Shift, supra note 247, at 3.
251 See In a Glimpse of Possible Things to Come in Hydropower Relicensing, INSIDE
FERC, Apr. 26, 1999, at 8.
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according to Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt.252 Such a settlement
may lead either to a new license (perhaps a "living license") with
environmental conditions imposed, or even to outright removal, as we saw
with the Edwards Dam.
After the destruction of Edwards Dam and subsequent proposals
for other dam removals, "the assumption that dams are permanent fixtures
has . . . been breached .. . ,253 Changing attitudes toward the
environmental impacts of dams have radically rearranged policy priorities
for their regulation and licensing. As Secretary Babbitt has said, the new
approach toward relicensing "is as significant in the history of regulatory
culture . . . as the original regulatory model set up during the New
Deal. 254 No longer is FERC the ultimate authority with absolute power
to determine the terms of dam licenses. Both state and federal resources
agencies, and citizen groups in some cases, have the ability to affect
whether or not existing hydropower dams will be able to continue
producing electricity.
252 Babbitt Urges FERC to Stay the Course on Hydro Relicensing Efforts, INSIDE FERC,
July 13, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter Babbitt Urges FERC].
253 McManus, supra note 246.
254 Babbitt Urges FERC, supra note 252, at 4.
